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COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF ANTITRUST LAW 
BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 
By 
Roy J. Girasa* 
Pace University 
Antitrust law in the Unites States and in Japan are 
fundamentally similar. There are, however, significant 
and minor differences. Both aspects will be explored in 
this paper. We will first summarily examine the nature 
of antitrust law in the United States and then compare 
its common and dissimilar characteristics with that of 
Japan. 
There are three basic statutes which together Wi·th 
their amendments define antitrust prohibitions and 
sanctions in the United States. They are: the Sherman 
Antitrust Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of 1914 and the 
Federal Trade Commission Act to 1914. 
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 18901 
The act as amended states: 
Section 1 "Every contract, 
combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among 
the several States, or with foreign 
nations, is hereby declared to be 
illegal. Every person who shall make 
any such contract or engage in any 
such combination or conspiracy shall 
be guilty of a felony ... 
Section 2 "Every person who shall 
monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire 
with any other person or persons, to 
monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, 
or with foreign nations, shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony ... " 
Jurisdiction The constitutional basis for 
Congressional intervention in antitrust activities is 
*J.D., Ph.D., Professor of Law, Lubin School of 
Business, Pace University, Pleasantville,New York. 
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its power under Article I, Section 8 to regulate 
interstate commerce . Although the U.S. Supreme Court 
initially interpreted the commerce clause excluding 
manufacturing as well as service industries, the court 
found activity to be in interstate commerce if it 
actually involves multi-state transactions or affects 
persons in other states in little more than a minimal 
way. In addition to interstate commerce, the 
prohibitions also affect foreign commerce. Activities by 
companies abroad which if domestic would violate the 
statute and cause an effect within the United States, 
come also within the constitutional power to regulate 
commerce. 3 
Conspiracy The Sh•rman Act, Section 1, prohibits 
agreements or conspiracies to restrain trade. As in the 
entire field of antitrust litigations, the wording of 
the statute, though simple in appearance, is enormously 
complex. This section is concerned with "horizontal" 
restraints. The activity must involve more than one 
legal person. Generally, a corporation cannot "conspire" 
or contract with its officers, directors or employees to 
violate the statute even though such persons are 
affiliated with a subsidiary company. 4 
conscious parallelism An expressed agreement 
between competitors clearly comes within the purview of 
the statute. The difficulty arises when there is no such 
agreement but the conduct of the parties exhibit 
behavior which the courts may prohibit. In one case, 
Interstate Circuit. Inc. v. United States5 , the United 
states Supreme Court held that a conspiracy contract or 
combination may be formed without direct proof of such 
an agreement. It would be sufficient to show that 
participants acted in a substantially similar manner, 
possessed the motive for so acting and had knowledge of 
the actions which would be taken by the other parties. 
"Rule of reason" v. per se" illegality. The statute 
forbids conduct which restrains trade. Although the 
Supreme court initially gave literal application to the 
statutory wording so as to forbid all conduct having any 
restraint on trade, it later modified its ruling so as 
to prov;.de that only unreasonable restraints would be 
banned. Under the rule of reason, the Court would 
determine whether or not conduct was illegal by 
examining a variety of factors such as the nature of the 
restraint, its purpose, possible benefits to the public, 
harmful effects and other factors. Nevertheless, there 
were certain types of conduct which were by their very 
nature (per se) violative of the Sherman Act. These 
include: 
{1) Price fixing Any agreement between competitors 
whose purpose is to raise, depress or stabilize 
in interstate or foreign commerce is per se unlawful. 
( 2) Division of markets. Any arrangement by 
competitors on the same distributive level ' which 
or implicitly divides territories is 
wrongful. Even indirect divisions of markets which 
affect interstate or foreign commerce is prohibited. 9 
(3) Boycotts Agreements betweenwcompetitors which 
prohibit them from dealing with certain other 
competitors or trades are per se illegal. 
(4) Resale price maintenance It is useful for a 
seller to dictate the price at which a buyer of the 
goods may resell them. on·ce a seller has disposed of the 
goods, they may be resold at whatever price the 
distributor or retailer desires. 
"Rule of reason" Not all restraints are 
automatically invalid under Sherman {1). In most cases 
the "Rule of reason" applies, i.e., only unreasonable 
restraints are prohibited. Examples include: 
{1) Agreement to exchange data such as price 
information. 10tendency to stabilize prices rather than 
allowing market forces to determine the price structure. 
{2) Self-regulation by associations. 
(3) Joint ventures in themselves are legal, i.e., 
two or more companies banding together to perform a 
particular project (e.g., the construction of a dam, 
building of a pipeline, etc.). The problem arises when 
two or more competitors join together for unlawful ends. 
Monopolies. Section 2 of the Sherman Act forbids 
monopolizing or attempts to monopolize. It does not 
forbid monopolies in and of themselves. There are two 
elements necessary to establish an offense: "{1) the 
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and 
(2) the wilful acquisition or maintenance of that power 
as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a SUPjfior product, business acumen or 
historical accident." 
Monopoly power is the power to control prices or 
exclude competition. Crucial to an understanding of 
monopolizing is the determination of the relevant 
geographic or product market. Product market refers to 
possible substitutes or reasonable interchangeability of 
products. 
Geographic market is the area in which a 
particular company and its competition operate. The area 
may be nationwide, regional or local. Whether or not a 
company appears to be monopolistic often depends upon 
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the geographical area which the court determines to be 
the relevant market. 
Wilful act. In addition to possessing power which 
alone is not sufficient to be violative of the statute, 
a company must commit an act to acquire or enhance its 
monopoly power. If a company becomes a monopoly simply 
because others fail to enter the market or because of an 
exclusive product, there is no violation of Sherman. 
Attempts and conspiracies to monopolize are also 
prohibited by Sherman (1). Attempt relates to the effort 
made by a party to accomplish the goal of monopolizing, 
intending to and committing an overt act in so doing. 
The conduct required is similar to the conduct described 
above for monopolizing. 
Conspiracy to monopolize is the attempt ·to 
monopolize in unison with at least another person with 
intent to monopolize. 
Sanctions for violations The Sherman Act is the 
only statute of the three major antitrust laws which 
imposes criminal as well as civil penalties. Individuals 
who violate the Sherman Act can be imprisoned up to 
three years and issued a fine up to $100,000.00. 
Corporations can· be fined up to $1,000,000.00. Corporate 
officers acting on behalf of the company can be fined up 
to $5,000.00 and/or one year in prison. It is more 
likely, however, that the federal government will 
utilize the equitable powers of the court, i.e., the 
prosecution will generally ask the Court to issue an 
injunction to prevent and restrain the offending 
conduct, divide the assets of a company, compel a 
divestiture of subsidiaries of a company, grant licenses 
to competitors, cancel contracts and other court-
fashioned remedies. 
THE CLAYTON ACT OF 1914 12 
After a decade of antitrust experience, many of the 
abuses which previously existed continued to prevail in 
a variety of forms. They were due in part to experienced 
corporation counsel who devised a multi tude of 
techniques to avoid Sherman Act restraints. Congress 
attempted to close these loopholes in 1914 by the 
enactment of two major statutes, namely, the Clayton Act 
and the Federal Trade Commission Act. These statutes, as 
amended, cover a variety of abuses of which corporate 
and other business persons should be aware. 
Price Discrimination Section 2 of the Clayton Act 
as substantially modified by and known as the "Robinso':l-
Patman Act of 1936, "provided in subsection (a) that 1t 
is unlawful to engage in price discrimination "between 
different purchases of commodities of like grade and 
quality •.. where the effect of such discrimination may be 
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a 
monopoly in any line of comm?rc;:e ... " The 
requires a number of prerequ1s1tes before a v1olat1on 
will be found, namely: 
(a) The persons involved must be engaged in 
interstate commerce; "" 
(b) There must be at least two sales between 
different purchases at a discriminatory price .. There 
must be two distinct sales, not merely a lease, l1cense, 
consignment or other like arrangement; 
(c) The sales must be fairly contemporaneous. 
(d) Sales "of commodities of like goods and 
quality" must be involved. Only tangible rather than 
intangible products are within the statute. 
(e) There must be a "discrimination in price." "Price" 
is not merely the charge for the goods but includes 
terms of sale such as credit and preferential 
allowances. Allowing some buyers preferential credit 
treatment may violate the statute. 
Defenses A person charged with a Robinson-Patman 
price discrimination offense may defend against 
liability by interposing a number of defenses 
specifically authorized by the Act. These defenses 
include: 
(a) Cost differential Section 2(a) says that 
the statute does not "prevent differentials which make 
only due allowance for differences in the cost to 
manufacture, sale or delivery resulting from the 
differing methods or quantities in which such 
commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered ... " 
A seller can classify an average customer into various 
groups provided they are relatively homogenous. 
(b) Changing conditions Another defense which 
a person may interpose is proof that price variations 
took place in response to a change in conditions such as 
"actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods, 
obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under 
court process, or sales in good faith in discontinuance 
of business in the good concerned." The mr:t common 
example is the lowering of prices for o tdated or 
seasonal items. 
(c) Meeting competition Section 2(b) states 
that a seller can justify price differentiation by 
"showing that his lower price or the furnishing of 
services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers 
was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of 
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a competitor, ol the services or facilities furnished by 
a competitor." 1 
Indirect price discrimination-broker allowances 
section 2 (c) makes it unlawful "to pay or grant,, o:.; to 
receive or accept, anything of value as a 
brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowanc.:; or 
discount in lieu thereof, except for 
rendered ••. " 
compensation for services and promotions Section 
2(d) makes it unlawful for a seller to pay for services 
or facilities rendered or furnished by a buyer unless 
such compensation is available on a proportionate basis 
to all other customers of competing products. Section 
2(e) forbids a seller from furnishing services or 
facilities to buyers unless they are rendered to all 
buyers on a proportionate basis. 
Tying arrangements Section 3 of the Clayton Act 
forbids a seller or lessor of a commodity from 
conditioning or tying its sale or lease to the purchase 
or lease of another product. There must be at least two 
separate products: the tying and the tied product. A 
second requirement is that the seller or lessor have 
substantial market power so as to be able to lessen 
competition substantially. 14 . , 
Mergers The first paragraph of Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act, amended in 1950 and 1980, sets forth the 
merger provision: 
"No person engaged in commerce or in 
any activity affecting commerce 
shall acquire, directly or 
indirectly, the whole or any part of 
the stock or other share capital and 
no person subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade 
Commission shall acquire the whole 
or any part of the assets of another 
person engaged also in commerce or 
in any activity effecting commerce 
where in any line of commerce or in 
any activity affecting commerce, in 
any section of the country, the 
effect of such acquisition may be 
substantially to lessen competition, 
or to tend to create a monopoly." 
The merger involves the combining of previously 
separate firms into one having a common ownership and 
control. Originally, the Clayton Act forbade the 
acquisition of stock in another corporation which tended 
to lessen competition. The Cellar-Kefauver Act of 1950 
amended Section 7 to include asset acquisitions as well 
as stock mergers. 15 
· · Remedies The Clayton Act provides only for civil 
remedies as distinguished from criminal penalties. The 
United States Government acts through the Justice 
Department and the Federal Trade Commission in its 
administrative hearings. Private parties have broad 
remedies for statutory violations directly affecting 
them. Equitable remedies allowable to the government 
include actions to: (1) enjoin or stop the defendant 
from committing the offending act; (2) cause a 
divestiture or severing· of relationship if an action 
such as a completed merger has taken place; (3) 
preliminarily enjoin a present activity pending 
determination of the outcome; (4) compel a company· to 
license or give permission to others to use its patents, 
trademarks or copyrights; and (5) divide the assets of 
a company. In addition, the parties may be induced to 
enter into consent decrees whereby the parties settle 
under certain terms and conditions. Approximately 85 
percent of all cases are resolved in this manner. 
The most potent private remedy is an action for 
treble damages. A private party is able to collect three 
times its provable damages plus a reasonable attorney's 
fee for loss of profits, added costs attributable to the 
forbidden activity and decrease in value, if any, of the 
injured party's investment. The litigant, however, must 
establish a causal relationship between its damages and 
the action of the offending party. 
Exceptions Exempted from the prohibitions of the 
Clayton Act include labor unions and business concerns 
controlled by other governmental agencies, such as 
banks, railroads, airlines and stock exchanges. 
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT OF 1914 16 
The third major piece of legislation governing 
antitrust activities is the Federal Trade Commission Act 
enacted at the same time as the Clayton Act. The Act 
created the Federal Trade Commission. Section 5(a) (1) 
grants antitrust jurisdiction to the FTC by providing: 
"Uniform methods of competition in commerce, and unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, and unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby 
declared unlawful." Section 5 (a) ( 6) provides: "The 
Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent 
persons, partnerships or corporations ... from using 
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unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices on commerce." 
The FTC is solely empowered to enforce Section 
5(a) (1) above and to enforce, together with the Attorney 
General, the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Section 5(a) (1) 
is so broad that virtually all conduct prohibited by the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts comes within its purview. For 
example, conspiracy or attempts to monopolize, price 
fixing, vertical and horizontal restraints are "unfair 
methods of competition." The provision is broader than 
the Sherman and Clayton prohibitions. Thus, certain 
conduct not forbidden under these laws may be proscribed 
under the Act. 
The FTC is empowered to protect the consumer 
against deceptive and unfair acts or practices such as 
false and misleading advertising, deceptive claims, 
nondisclosure of hazardous products and deceptive 
warranty representations. It has the power to conduct 
broad investigations of possible antitrust violations 
• • • I 1nclud1ng the 1ssuance of subpoenas. It may issue 
guidelines, advisory opinions and enter into consent 
decrees with persons who may be violating the laws 
within FTC jurisdiction. It may sue in Federal Courts 
for the issuance of an injunction and can issue cease 
and desist ·order's directly, Violations of its orders can 
result in civil penalties of up to $10,000.00 per day. 
We will now review the manner in which Japan 
promulgates and enforces its antitrust laws. 
Japanese Antitrust Law 
The historical development of Japan's policy with 
respect ot cartels may be divided into three major eras, 
namely, the Tokugawa Shogunate Era (1603-1868) · the post 
Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the post World II Era. 
Prior the governments were essentially 
feudal1st1c 1n nature w1th emphasis upon the concept of 
"wa" or social harmony which mandated that commercial 
be resolved without litigation. Individual 
r1ghts were subsumed to that of society. 17 
The Tokugawa government was overthrown in 1868 and 
by a under the Emperor known as the 
Me1J1 of 1868. The Restoration brought about 
a of the feudal based society into the modern 
a reformed monetary, educational and 
system. Government worked closely with 
1ndustry to create ,, a unique form of Japanese 
cap1tal1sm. As in the U.S., various cartels formed known 
as 7he Zaibatsu combines, led by a number of families. 
Unl1ke the u.s. which passed the several antitrust laws 
referred to in this paper, the government virtually 
fostered cartels and monopolies which it found easi1r to 
control than a more pluralistic industrial complex. 1 The 
four major Zaibatsu families of Missui Mitsubishi 
and Yasuda controlled 544 which 
const1tuted almost half of the financial sector and a 
third of heavy industry. 
The allied victory over Japan led to a dissolution 
the Zaibatsu groups. President Harry s. Truman • s 
d1rective of September 6, 1945 to General Douglas 
MacArthur mandated the development of democratic 
o:ganizations in labor, industry and agriculture 
d1rected to peaceful ends, It stated: 
"To this end it shall be the 
policy of the Supreme Commander 
(a) to prohibit the retention in or 
selection of places of importance in 
the economic field of individuals 
who do not direct future Japanese 
economic effort solely toward 
peaceful ends; and 
(b) ro favor a program for the 
dissolution of the large industrial 
and banking combinations which have 
exercised control for a great part 
of Japan's trade and industry. 
. issued a Directive calling for the 
d1ssolut1on of the Zaibatsu and other combinations of 
enterprise, the abolition of private and 
the establishment of a competitive system. 1 Ultimately, 
the statute, which was an enactment of these goals was 
passed and made effective on July 20, 1947 and was known 
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as the "Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly 
and Maintenance of Fair Trade. 1120 The Act was modeled 
upon the three major u.s. antitrust enactments, 
the Act, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade 
comm1ss1on Act. 
The Japanese Antimonopoly Act of 19472 1 
The purpose of the Act is set forth in Section 1: 
"This Act, by prohibiting 
private monopolization, unreasonable 
restraint of trade and unfair 
business practices, by preventing 
the excessive concentration of 
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economic power and by eliminating 
unreasonable restraint of 
production, sale, price, technology, 
and the like and all other undue 
restoration of business activities 
through combination agreements and 
otherwise, aims to promote free and 
fair competition, to stimulate the 
initiative of entrepreneurs, to 
encourage business activities of 
enterprises, to heighten the level 
of employment and people's real 
income and thereby to prevent the 
domestic and wholesome development 
of the national economy as well as 
to assure the interest of consumers 
in general." 
The purpose clause clearly is reflective of the 
goods of the U.S. statutes outlined above. The 
substantive requirements are set forth in Section 3 of 
Chapter II which states that "No entrepreneurs shall 
effect private monopolization of any unreasonable 
restraint of trade." The section is a summary of the two 
substantive sections of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 
Section 19 Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act by forbidding an entrepreneur from 
employing unfair business practices. The Federal Trade 
Commission Act created the Federal Trade Commission to 
enforce the provisions for the Act. Enforcement of the 
Japanese Antimonopoly statute is by the Fair Trade 
Commission. The similarity in nomenclature is not 
coincidental. 
Section 2 of the Antimonopoly Act defines each of 
the key words of Section 3. "Entrepreneur" is any person 
who carries on a commercial, industrial, financial or 
other business including officers, employers or agents 
or thereof. "Private monopolization" refers to business 
activities by any person acting alone or in combination 
or conspiracy with other entrepreneurs [almost identical 
to Sherman Act, Section 2. "Every person who shall 
monopolize .... or combine or conspire with any other 
person"] which excludes or controls business activities 
of other entrepreneurs causing a substantial restraint 
of competition in any particular field or trade 
[Sherman: "Every contract combination .... or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or among the several 
States, or with foreign nations is declared to be 
illegal."] "Unreasonable restraint of trade" is defined 
as business activities by contract or concerted 
activities which mutually restrict their business 
practice so as to fix, maintain, or enhance prices, or 
to limit production, technology, products, facilities or 
customers or suppliers causing a substantial restraint 
of competition [Section 2(6)] This definition is very 
similar to Section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act. 
Fair Business Practices The prohibition against 
monopolization extends to international agreements or 
contracts containing subject matter which constitutes 
unreasonable restraint of trade or unfair business 
practices [Section 6(1)]. Unfair business practices 
refers to any act which tends to impede fair competition 
and which: ( 1) unduly discriminates against other 
entrepreneurs; (2) deals at undue prices; (3) 
unreasonably induces or coerces customers of a 
competition to deal with oneself; (4) trading with 
another party so as to unjustly restrict the business 
activities of the latter; (5) abusing one's bargaining 
position; or (6) unjustly interfering with a transaction 
between a competitor and its customer or causing an 
officer or shareholder to act against the interest of 
hisjher company. The definition again is reflective of 
u.s. law particularly, the Robinson-Patman Act, with 
respect to price discrimination and predatory pricing 
practices (Section 2,3) as well as Clayton's prohibition 
of tying and boycott (Section 3). The last aspect of 
the definition is similar to u.s. Common law injunction 
against interference with contracts. (Pennsoil 
litigation) . 
The Fair Trade Commission further elaborated upon 
the meaning of "unfair practices" in its 
notifications of 1953 and 1982. 2 Among the specific 
prohibitions were: 
Unduly refusing to deal with a certain entrepreneur 
or restricting the quality or a substance of a commodity 
or causing another to so refuse service [U.S. - boycott 
provision of Clayton); 
Price discrimination [Compare Robinson-Patman); " 
Affording favorable or unfavorable treatment of 
entrepreneur (Robinson-Patman 2(d)]; 
Unjustly excluding an entrepreneur from a trade 
association or unjust discrimination against it; without 
proper justification, supplying a commodity or service 
excessively below cost or at a low cost on a continuous 
basis so as to cause difficulties to other 
entrepreneurs; 
Unjustly purchasing a commodity or service at a 
high price as to cause difficulties to other 
entrepreneurs; 
Wrongful inducement to customers of a competitor to 
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deal with oneself by alleged unsubstantial claims that 
one's commodity or service is better then competitor or 
by· offering unjust benefits in the light of normal 
business practices; 
unjustly causing a purchaser to purchase a 
commodity or service by tying it with another purchase 
or otherwise coercing the party to deal with oneself; 
Unjustly dealing with a party on condition that it 
does not deal with a competitor; 
Imposing resale price restriction without . p:oper 
justification upon the purchaser of one's commod1t1es; 
Abusing one's dominant bargaining position by 
unfairly compelling the other party to purchase a 
commodity or service not involved in the transaction 
causing it to provide money, service or other econom1c 
benefit not warranted under the circumstances, setting 
or changing terms of the transaction in . a 
disadvantageous way to the other party or 
imposing a disadvantage upon the other party regard1ng 
execution of the agreement; 
Interfering with the formation of a contract or 
inducing a breach of contract by a competitor; 
Interfering with the internal operation of a 
competitor by wrongful inducement of a shareholder in 
its exercise of voting rights divulgences of secrets or 
by any other means. 
Filing Section 6 (2) of the Act mandated that any 
entrepreneur entering into a international transaction 
which the Fair Trade Commission finds a tendency towards 
unfair business practice or unreasonable restraint of 
trade, shall file a report within 30 days with the FTC 
together with a copy of the contract or agreement or a 
memorandum of the substance of an oral agreement. Forms 
are provided by the FTC in accordance with the nature of 
the agreement. Failure to file such a report would 
subject the entrepreneur to a fine of up to 2 million 
yen and further subjects the offending officer, agents 
or committing the violation to a similar 
fine. No such comparable statute or regulation exists 
in the u.s. 2' 
Trade Association The act specifically addresses 
activities of trade association. Section 8(1) states: 
"No trade association shall engage 
in any one of the following acts: 
i) Substantially 
restricting competition in 
any particular field of 
trade; 
ii) Entering into an 
international agreement or 
an international contract 
as provided for in Section 
6(1) (Contracts which 
unreasonably restrain 
trade or unfair business 
practices; 
iii) Limiting the present 








iv) Unduly restricting the 
functions or activities of 
the constituent 
entrepreneurs (meaning an 
entrepreneur who is a 
member of the trade 
association; hereinafter 
the same); 
v) causing entrepreneurs 
to do acts as constitutes 
unfair business 
practices." 
The reason why trade associations are specifically 
addressed · is because historically these associations 
were meeting grounds for the formation of cartels. Every 
trade association is given 30 days to file a report with 
the FTC of its formation (Sec. 8(2)) as well as for any 
changes or termination thereof (Sec. 8(3) (4)). 
The FTC guideline formulated in August, 1979 
elaborated upon the statutory prohibition. Generally 
they prohibit price fixing of every nature, enforcement 
of resale prices maintenance, restriction of output, 
restriction of governing sales territory, and 
competition, restriction concerning development or use 
of technology, defamation of non-members and other 
restrictions. 
The remedy provided is similar to the remedy set 
forth above but in addition thereto. The FTC is 
empowered to issue a dissolution of the trade 
association and take any measure to carry out the 
statute. 
Monopolistic Situations If the FTC determines that a 
monopolistic situation exists, it may order the 
entrepreneur to transform a part of its business or take 
any other measures necessary to restore 
with respect to such goods and services. The statute 
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does place some limitations upon the FTC by foregoing 
statutory injunction if such action by the FTC reduces 
the business of the entrepreneurs to such an extent that 
the cash required for the sale of goods or services will 
rise sharply, undermines the financial position of the 
entrepreneur or makes it for it to maintain 
its international competitiveness. 6 
The FTC in making its determination is to consider 
the entrepreneur's (1) assets, means of expenditures; 
(2) officers and employees; (3) location of factories, 
workyards and offices; (4) business facilities and 
equipment; ( 5) the substance of intellectual property 
rights; ( 6) capacity of production and sales and for 
obtaining funds and materials and (7) aspects of supply 
and distr!bution of supply and distribution of goods or 
services. 7 
A "monopolistic situation" is defined at length in 
the Act in terms of market structure and market 
performance such the situation occurs whenever such 
structure or performance exists in an area of business 
where the total amount of prices of goods of the same 
description and those of other goods essentially similar 
thereto are supplied in Japan or the total amount of 
prices of supplied in Japan is in excess of 50 
billion yen for a one year period and; (a) the market 
share of one entrepreneur exceeds 50% or the combined 
share of entrepreneurs exceeds 75%; or (b) conditions 
exist which make new entrants very unlikely; or (c) 
where the increase in price for the goods or service or 
the decrease therein is slight considering the charges 
in the market place; and where the entrepreneur has 
earned for excessive profit rate or is expending for 
cost and administrative expenses far in excess of the 
norm. 28 
In such event the FTC shall notify the appropriate 
governmental ministry of the monopolistic situation who 
shall render his view regarding the existence or non-
existence of such a monopolistic situation as well as 
his recommendation as to which measures should be taken 
if such situation does exist. 29 A public is then 
held by the FTC to obtain the public's views. 3 The FTC 
will then issue a but only after it consults 
with such minister. The complaint must be in writing 
outlining the case. After the hearing in which all 
parties present their position, the commission renders 
its decision which may include the remedies heretofore 
stated. 32 
STOCKHOLDING, INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES, 
MERGER AND TRANSFER OF BUSINESS 
The Act addresses the prohibitions addressed by 
President Truman to General MacArthur. To eliminate the 
pre-war Zaibatsu combines, the Act 
prohibits the formation of a holding company. A "hold1ng 
company" is defined as: "a company whose principal 
business is to control the business activities of a 
company or companies in Japan by means of holding of 
stock (including shares of partnership ... " 3 It applies 
only to Japan and not to holding companies possessing 
the shares of a foreign company. 
Giant Company Giant companies also face restriction in 
stockholdings. Any stock company, other than one engaged 
in financial services (banks, insurance, securities), 
whose capital is larger than 10 billion yen or whose net 
assets are larger than 30 billion yen is not allowed· to 
acquire stock in Japanese companies in excess of its 
capital or its net assets whichever is larger. 
Exceptions include governmental corporations, 
corporations engaged in development of industries as 
permitted by a Cabinet Order and companies involved 
international business or foreign investments. 
Companies engaged in financial service have much 
stricter limitations purchases 5%) stock of 
mother company; 10% of 1nsurance compan1es . 
The Act prohibits the purchase of any stock of a 
company in Japan where the effect is to substantially 
restrain competition in any field of trade. 36 Compare 
section 7 of the Clayton Act which forbids the 
acquisition of stock or other share capital of assets of 
another corporation where the effect is to substantially 
lesser competition or tends to create a monopoly. The 
Japanese FTC, like the u.s. FTC has guidelines with 
respect to mergers. 
The FTC will closely examine all stockholdings 
where the combined market share is 25% or more; the 
combined market share is one-third and the combined 
share of the top three companies is 50% or more where 
there are seven or few competitors; and where the total 
assets of one corporation is 100 bil}ion yen and the 
other party is 10 billion yen or more. 7 
Financial Company The Act restricts stockholding by a 
financial company by forbidding the acquisition of 
shares by a company engaged in the financial sector from 
acquiring or holding stock of another company in Japan 
to the extent of greater than 5 percent or 10 percent if 




given the authority t .o . grant ex?eptions. with 
consultation with the M1n1ster of F1nance 1f the 
acquisition was the result of enforcement of a lien, 
pledges mortgage or payment of an indebtedness or 
was of shares in a securities firm or it was 
acquisition of stock in the form of trust property or 
securities trust. 38 
Interlocking directorates The Act forbids an officer or 
employee of a company from holding a similar portion in 
another company in Japan where the effect is to 
substantially lessen competition in a field or trade. A 
company in Japan cannot compel a competing company to 
hire one of its officers or employees to act as an 
officer in such other company. If an officer or employee 
does possess such status and the total assets of either 
company exceeds 2 billion yen, sfhe must file a report 
with FTC within 30 days of assumption of such 
office. Compare Section 8 of Clayton Act which 
provides that "No person at the same time shall be a 
director in any tow or more corporations, any one of 
which has capital, surplus, and individual profits 
aggregating more than $1,000,000 ... " 
Restriction on purchase of shares by an individual The 
Act forbids a person other than a company from acquiring 
or ., holding stock of another company which such 
acquisition may restrain competition in such acquisition 
is accomplished by unfair business practice. If a 
purchase of shares in mutual competing companies exceeds 
10 percent of the second companys he must file a report 
with the FTC within 30 days of acquisition. 40 
Restriction on mergers The Act forbids mergers or 
consolidation (a) where the effect may be to 
substantially restrain competition in any field or trade 
or (b) when unfair business practices have been emf{oyed 
in the course of such merger or consolidation. All 
mergers or consolidations must be done by filing a 
report with the FTC and must wait for the expiration of 
a 30 day waiting period from date of filing. The FTC may 
extend the period to 60 days with consent of the 
companies or shorten the said period. The FTC must file 
its complaint or recommendation within the said waiting 
period unless there has been false made in 
the filing with respect to important matters.' 
Restrictions on acquisition of assets De facto mergers 
are also subject to the preceding section where a 
company acquires the business or fixed assets of a 
competing company or leases most of the business of 
another company or enters into a join profit and loss 
account arrangement with another company. 43 
It should be noted that the prohibition of this and 
preceding section are applicable only within Japan. It 
is not unlawful to merge or acquire assets in competing 
companies beyond its borders. 
Parallel Price Increases Historically, u.s. courts have 
applied the concept of "conscious parallelism" where 
direct proof of concerted price fixing or other wrongful 
conduct has not been established but where conduct has 
occurred and the parties had knowledge, motive and 
substantifl unanimity with respect to each other•s 
actions. The Antimonopoly Act addressed similar 
parallelism with respect ·to price increases. The FTC may 
inquire and compel a report from entrepreneurs 
requesting reasons for the in price of goods and 
services where the total price of goods or services · of 
the same type is in excess of 30 billion yen and the 
rises by the largest entrepreneur with an aggregate 
market share in excess share in excess of 70 percent is 
almost identical within a 3 month period. 45 
Exemptions The U.S. exempts certain entities from the 
antitrust laws. They include air carriers, agricultural 
organizations, , motor, rail and interstate water 
carriers, export trade associations, stack ·exchanges and 
labor union. Similarly, exemptions are granted under the 
Antimonopoly laws to persons engaged in a rail way, 
electricity, gas and other enterprises which by nature 
are monopolies. Other exemptions include those permitted 
by law, monopolies arising under intellectual property 
right enactments (patents, copyright, trademark), acts 
of cooperative and statutory exception for agriculture, 
consumer coops, labor unions, and 
public service mutual aid association. 6 
Enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law Violations of the 
Antimonopoly laws are enforced against in four ways: (1) 
administrative guidance; (2) formal action by the FTC; 
(3) criminal initiated by the FTC; and (4) 
private litigation. 7 The FTC is given broad powers 
under the Antimonopoly laws to initiate both civil and 
criminal proceedings. Any person is allowed to file a 
complaint with the FTC which may undertake an 
investigation. The FTC then determines what action if 
any, to undertake. A report of its investigation is 
given to the complainant. If action is mandated, the FTC 
then initiates the appropriate procedure varies 
depending upon the nature of the violation. 
In its investigation, the FTC may order persons 
43 
44 
affect or witnesses to appear for interrogation. It may 
further order experts to appear and give expert 
testimony, order submission of accounting books and 
records and enter upon any place of business being 
investigated to inspect conditions rf its operations as 
well as its books and records. 4 A record of its 
investigation must be maintained. 
The FTC upon a finding of a violation of 
monopolization of unreasonable restraint of trade, trade 
association violation and other violations, may 
recommend that the persons affected take appropriate 
measure to cure the violations. If the person accepts 
the recommendation, a decision is rendered without a 
formal hearing. If the FTC finds a violation of Section 
7 of the Act (private monopolization or restraint of 
trade), it may order the entrepreneur to pay the 
Japanese Treasury a surcharge. If the objects 
timely, a hearing procedure will be commenced. 0 
A formal hearing is initiated by the issuance by 
the FTC of a complaint which is in writing and which 
outlines the case. The respondent submits an answer. 
Generally a hearing examiner then conducts the 
proceeding in which both sides submit their evidence. 
The hearing is public unless it is necessary to protect 
trade secrets. The commission then makes a 
determination, based upon the hearing, whether a 
violation has taken place. A certified copy of the 
written decision is served upon the respondent. The 
respondent may bring on a lawsuit in Court to grant a 
decision of the FTC; however, the findings of fact by 
the FTC shall, if supported by substantial evidence, be 
binding upon the Court. The Court may grant the decision 
if the decision is not supported by substantial evidence 
or is inconsistent with the constitution or other laws 
or prders. 51 
General Considerations American companies wishing to do 
business in Japan must be attentive to the above stated 
statutory prohibitions. A U.S. company must be careful 
no to become designated as a holding company, i.e. , 
where its principal business is to control business 
activities of other companies. The exception are: ( 1) 
where the holding company is engaged in the same line of 
business and (2) a foreign holding corporations and its 
related companies may control one Japanese corporation 
even if it is not in the same line of business. 
Like the U.S., the Antimonopoly Law has 
extraterritorial reach. In order to be affected by the 
statute, a presence is necessary either by way of a u.s. 
corporation's acquisition of a Japanese corporation or 
its assets or at least "close contracts" with Japan. 
service of process howevez::, must be .acco;'llplished 5 fY service upon a place of bus1ness or off1ce 1n Japan. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Anti trust laws of Japan and the U.S. have a 
great deal of similarity. It appears initially that the 
Japanese legislation may be stricter than the U.S. but 
enforcement tends to be relatively lax. Nevertheless, 
companies doing business in Japan must conform to the 
statutory requirements to avoid conflict with local 
authorities. 
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